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Abstract
In this paper I address a vexing, but curiously understudied subject: How
do mediators decide what to do under the volatile, unpredictable, and fast
moving circumstances under which they work? There are two familiar
responses to this question. One is that mediator decisionmaking is
"intuitive, " especially for highly experienced professionals. Another is
couched in terms of mediator identification with some formal model of
practice such as facilitative or transformative mediation. There are good
reasons to believe that neither intuition nor reliance on a formal model
provide a satisfying answer to questions about mediator decisionmaking. I
summarize the findings from three in-depth studies using reflective case
study methods that suggest a more complete answer to the question. These
studies include an investigation of divorce mediation,I a study of the work of
ombuds-mediators working at the National Institutes of Health,2 and a study
of mediators brought into the psychology laboratory to mediate a simulated
conflict between two college roommates.3 We have learned from these
investigations that tacit knowledge-which we have variously described
under headings like mediator "styles, " "mental models, " or "schemas of
practice, "-plays a powerful role in such decisionmaking, is often at striking
variance with what practitioners consciously believe they are doing, and can
be gotten at by methods that help practitioners access their tacit
decisionmaking knowledge. The methodological and practical implications
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of these findings for future research on mediator decisionmaking are
considered.
In this paper I address a vexing, but curiously understudied subject: How
do mediators decide what to do under the volatile, unpredictable, and fast
moving circumstances in which they work? I refer to conundrums like:
"Should I intervene now or wait?" "If I decide to intervene, what should I say
and how should I say it?" "Oops! Didn't expect him to say that! Now what
do I say?"
There are two familiar responses to these kinds of questions. One is that
mediator decisionmaking is "intuitive," especially for highly experienced
professionals. It was a familiar theme among the New York City labor
mediators I interviewed about their work way back in the 1970s when I first
began studying the mediation process 4 and I have heard it often since then.
Another common response is couched in terms of mediator identification
with some formal model of the mediation role-e.g. "I am a transformative
mediator so I make decisions based on what will lead to empowerment and
recognition," or "I am a facilitative mediator, so I decide on interventions
that will promote a 'win/win,". As mediation has become more
professionalized, formal models of practice are invoked frequently as the
basis for mediator decisionmaking.
However, there are good reasons to believe that neither of these
responses provides a fully satisfying answer to questions about mediator
decisionmaking. In this paper I will summarize the findings from three in-
depth studies that my colleagues and I have done over a period of 20 years-
this kind of research is slow-that bear directly on the question of how
mediators decide what to do on a moment-by-moment basis.
The three investigations include a study of divorce mediation conducted
in a family court;5 an investigation of the work of ombuds-mediators
managing conflicts among scientists working at the National Institutes of
Health 6 and a study of mediators brought into the psychology laboratory to
mediate a simulated conflict between two college roommates. All three
investigations used case-based methods and focused on mediator cognition,
particularly implicit, nonconscious cognition. All of them bore in one-way or
another on the question: "What must the mediator have been thinking to
have done that? "
My main theme will be that mediator decisionmaking is the product of
largely unconscious and highly personal ideas that mediators hold about the
4 KENNETH KRESSEL, LABOR MEDIATION: AN EXPLORATORY SURVEY (1972).
5 Kressel et al., supra note 1.
6 Kressel & Gadlin, supra note 2.
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nature of conflict, the goals to be attained by intervention, and implicit
intervention "scripts." It is my hypothesis that these tacit ideas appear to be a
more powerful determinant of what occurs in mediation than the formal
models of mediation practice we are familiar with.
My purpose is not only to describe what we have learned about the
complexities of mediator decisionmaking. For a long time, it has been very
clear that there is an enormous gap between what mediation researchers do
and what mediation practitioners care about. I want to use the research
experiences that I will summarize to suggest research that will be of genuine
interest to practicing mediators and that may even get them involved as
active research collaborators. (Maybe things will go faster if more hands are
on deck).
I. THE ESSEX COUNTY DIVORCE MEDIATION STUDY: THE PROBLEM-
SOLVING STYLE VS. THE SETTLEMENT ORIENTED STYLE
The divorce mediation study was my introduction to the challenges of
doing practice-relevant research. It was funded by the New Jersey
Administrative Office of the Courts as part of the New Jersey Supreme
Court's efforts to assess the suitability of mediation as an adjunct to the
traditional exclusive reliance on lawyers. The idea seems quaint by today's
standards, but at the time the specter of court-endorsed divorce mediation
represented the end of life on Earth as we know it for many members of the
organized bar.
The project team consisted of an attorney, Linda Fish, two court
probation officers, Sam Forlenza and Fran Butler, and myself. The project
had as its goal developing a workable approach to divorce mediation through
a process of reflective team debriefings. Little did I suspect that the approach
to divorce mediation we sought to develop was already largely there, waiting
to be discovered, principally in the mind of Fran Butler.7.
Some three years and nearly fifty case debriefings later we were
collectively able to articulate what Butler "knew."8 We called it The
Problem-Solving Style (PSS). There was another implicit approach among
the team members that we also were able to describe that contrasted strongly
with PSS. We labeled it The Settlement-Oriented Style (SOS). The two styles
had contrasting goals, very different decisionmaking "scripts," and
7 Kenneth Kressel, Fran Butler: Questions that Lead to Answers in Child Custody
Mediation, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 17 (Deborah M. Kolb ed.,
1994).
8 Id.; Kressel et al., supra note 1.
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discernibly different impacts on the mediation process and its outcomes.
Both approaches could be helpful, but PSS was better, particularly for
difficult cases. All of this became clear to us only after many, many months
of reflective case debriefings, because the two styles, while very different
from each other, were in the category of what psychologists and philosophers
call tacit knowledge, hidden somewhere in the unconscious of team
members. We could make the two contrasting styles explicit only by
adopting systematic reflective procedures to bring this tacit knowledge into
our conscious awareness.
The simpler of the two approaches was the Settlement-Oriented Style.
The mediator enacting SOS appeared primarily concerned with getting a
settlement as quickly as possible. A mediator operating in this tacit style
relied on a behavioral script that focused exclusively on the surface positions
of the parties and sought to reconcile their differences with a m6lange of
strategies including exhortations to cooperate, warnings about the financial
and emotional costs of continued conflict, praise for efforts at problem-
solving, and brainstorming. The implicit SOS decisionmaking script also
attached great salience to maintaining neutrality and appeared to be based on
the assumption that the primary responsibility for problem-solving rested
with the parties. When they were motivated to end their legal dispute, SOS
could be a useful vehicle to that end, helping them exit the legal arena with a
modicum of efficiency. However, in cases in which the parties were deeply
polarized SOS was less successful: agreements were either not reached or, if
reached, were likely to break down.
The Problem-Solving Style represented a very different approach.
Mediators operating in the PSS mode appeared less concerned with the
narrow objective of settlement and much more interested in the orchestration
of a process of quality problem-solving. This process focused on identifying
the reasons the parties' own efforts to resolve their differences had broken
down and using what was learned to depolarize the conflict. The behavioral
script associated with this objective began with an initial period of intense
question asking that we labeled the interrogatory style. Using the
interrogatory mode, PSS mediators appeared to be actively generating,
testing, and refining hypotheses in their own minds about the sources of the
conflict, a mental activity that was typically confirmed during our case
conference discussions. The visible result was that the mediator was
ultimately able to present the parties with considered proposals for breaking
impasses. In contrast to the proposals of the SOS mediators, however, these
suggestions were well embedded in an understanding of the dispute and the
circumstances in which the parties were constrained to function. The parties
were encouraged to react to and modify the mediator's proposal, in a
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distinctive "working through" stage, with the mediator playing an active and
directive role, while respecting the parties' feelings and perspectives. The
Problem-Solving Style produced a more focused, structured and vigorous
approach to conflict resolution than the Settlement-Oriented one; resulted in
more frequent and durable settlements, especially in high conflict cases; and
produced a more favorable attitude toward the mediation experienced. SOS
was not necessarily bad, but PSS was better.
The Essex County study established a number of important themes about
how to study mediator decisionmaking (although at the time I did not couch
what I was learning in decisionmaking terms).
The first theme was that expert mediators (like Fran Butler) often know
much more than they can say and that many of the more interesting and
useful things they know are of this type. The study also illustrated that less
expert performers also know more than they can say. The SOS model was of
this type. Making both models explicit was motivating to our team and made
learning to use PSS easier (although not necessarily easy for those team
members more strongly wedded to SOS). Eventually we developed a
successful training program to teach PSS to others.
The study also helped shape my thinking about the reflective learning
process. Among other things it established in my mind the scientific
legitimacy of reflective self-study as a vehicle for doing research that would
be useful for practice. The project also helped me formulate some
rudimentary but useful ground rules for the reflective process, including the
value of case protocols to help promote systematic reflection, the need to
focus on concrete intervention decisions ("why did you do that then?"), and
the importance of challenging team members supportively but firmly about
their intervention decisions. I later attempted to codify these and other
matters in a paper on the reflective case study method. 9
Finally, in trying to explain our results and justify our methods, the Essex
project led me to the work of Donald Schon about reflective professional
practicel 0 and the research of Gary Klein1' on expert decisionmaking in the
real world. It was tonic to discover from these sources that my intuitive
methods were well justified and that framing the study of mediator behavior
in terms of implicit knowledge was likely to be fruitful.
9 Kenneth Kressel, Practice-Relevant Research in Mediation: Toward a Reflective
Research Paradigm, 13 NEGOT. J. 143 (1997).
10 See generally DONALD. A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983).
11 See generally GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS
(1998).
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II. THE NIH STUDY OF OMBUDS-MEDIATORS: FROM MEDIATOR STYLES
TO MEDIATOR MENTAL MODELS
My paper on the reflective case study method' 2 that my colleagues and I
had used in the divorce mediation project led to an invitation from Howard
Gadlin, the Director of the Office of the Ombudsman at the NIH, to use the
method to help him and his colleagues improve their practice.
At the outset of the project, the requisite norms of the reflective case
study method were embodied in a written document that was circulated to all
team members and discussed in detail. The key injunctions were to ask the
mediator whose case was being considered open-ended but focused
questions, to clarify their unarticulated knowledge (e.g., "what was
happening?" or "what did you feel or see at that moment?"); to summarize
the mediator's response in order to insure understanding and create "space"
for reflection; to challenge the mediator in a firm, but respectful way (e.g.,
"why wouldn't 'x' have been a better intervention here?"); and to probe for
the concrete meaning of abstract terms (e.g., if "creating a trusting climate" is
offered as one of the effective mediator interventions, ask how trust was
created). A central part of my role as the reflective facilitator was to have the
group observe these norms to the greatest extent possible.
When we began our work, staff members told me that they had no
specific approach beyond an emphasis on being neutral facilitators ("every
case is different"). Several years and many, many hours of reflective case
discussions later, I re-learned the lesson I had learned in the family court:
although they were not consciously aware of it, the ombuds team had a clear
and differentiated set of ideas about practice. Their mental model consisted
of two strongly contrasting intervention scripts: a Deep Problem-Solving
script (DPS) focused on identifying and addressing latent issues of an
interpersonal or systemic kind and a Tactical Problem-Solving script (TPS)
focusing instead on the issues as presented by the parties. The tactical script
was applied in either an integrative bargaining mode or a more distributive
quasi-arbitration approach.
The reflective record made abundantly clear that a good deal of
ombudsman energy is devoted to the frequently vexing, if implicit, question
of whether the DPS or TPS script was a "best fit" to the dispute at hand. The
record also suggested that making this decision rested on a reasonably well
structured, if tacit, set of decision rules. The decision rules were of two
types: first order decision rules concerning the existence and nature of any
latent problems that may be present, and second order decision rules
12 Kressel, supra note 10.
714
[Vol.28:3 2013]
HOW DO MEDIATORS DECIDE WHAT TO DO?
concerning the parties' capacity to engage in "deep" problem-solving if
latent problems had been identified.
Despite their very different foci, both DPS and TPS appeared to follow
the same problem-solving stages, beginning with an intensive diagnostic
phase during which the decision rules were applied and a script "selection"
was made. DPS was clearly the preferred intervention mode of team
members. Every case began with at least a preliminary effort to search for
and address latent causes, and team members expressed dissatisfaction if they
could not apply DPS in cases where latent problems were thought to be
fueling the conflict. However, ombudsmen used the scripts flexibly and
switched to TPS if DPS was unnecessary or impractical.
The mental model of the NIH team was clearly shaped by the social
context in which the ombudsmen function. Thus, the primacy of DPS in the
model appears to be due to the fact that the ombudsmen are "repeat players"
in the life of the NIH and therefore become adept at recognizing the latent
sources of its dysfunctional conflicts; are under a strong role mandate as
ombudsmen to pay attention to covert patterns of organizational dysfunction;
and deal with disputants motivated to address latent issues blocking their
scientific work. The ombuds mediators are also strongly identified with the
NIH's core mission of promoting scientific excellence. For example, in a
dispute involving the struggle of promising junior scientists to separate from
senior colleagues who were blocking their path to research independence, the
ombuds-mediator was a skillful agent of fostering a scientific divorce. (This
type of conflict is so common in the institutional life of the NIH that the
ombuds team refers to it as the autonomy drama).
Compared to the description of mediator styles in the divorce project, the
account of the mental model of the NIH ombuds mediator team represents a
more detailed, nuanced, and complex surfacing of the implicit cognitive
structure behind mediator decisionmaking. Nonetheless, the two studies have
much in common. Collectively, they suggested strongly that mediator
intervention decisions do not involve choices among individual tactics or
strategies, but are driven in "top down" fashion by holistic, overarching if
implicit cognitive schema. The preferred schema in both studies were similar
in their emphasis on searching for underlying causes of which the parties
themselves were unaware and both relied heavily on mediator knowledge of
what the most common and problematic of these latent events or dynamics
were likely to be. These similarities I attribute to the fact that both settings
provided relatively stable, predictable environments in which to learn-what
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Kahneman and Klein' 3 have called high validity environments. The
procedure of reflective team debriefings made this learning explicit and
teachable.
In trying to make sense of the descriptive accounts of our cases churned
up by the reflective case procedures, I also turned increasingly to the research
literature on expertise and real world decisionmaking in domains outside of
mediation. This literature was largely supportive of the kinds of things, both
substantive and methodological, that I was learning with my NIH colleagues
and had already gotten a glimpse of in the divorce mediation project. As in
our two studies, research on expertise in other domains indicates that expert
knowledge typically becomes highly "automated" over time, and even
inaccessible to ordinary reflection (thus, experts frequently refer to their
"intuition"), unless special conditions for retrieval are provided.14 The idea
that expert thinking is strongly shaped by social, professional, and
institutional forces is also a staple of the literature on expertise in real-world
dynamic environments of the type that mediators must master. In such
environments expert performance is closely linked to acute situation
awareness15 and the recognition of recurring patterns' 6 of the kinds
embodied in Fran Butler's Problem-Solving Style of divorce mediation and
the Deep Problem-Solving model of Howard Gadlin and his colleagues.
III. BRINGING MEDIATOR DECISIONMAKING INTO THE PSYCHOLOGY
LABORATORY
After two field studies using the reflective case method, I wanted to get
at mediator cognition using a more controlled method to describe the
thinking behind mediator decisionmaking. Bringing experts into the
laboratory and studying their thought processes and behaviors has become a
staple for researchers who study experts in other domains of practice.' 7 I was
particularly attracted to the so-called "think aloud" method in which experts
are asked to perform a familiar task in their domain and report on their
13 Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to
Disagree, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 515 (2009).
14 ROBERT R. HOFFMAN & GAVAN LINTERN, Eliciting and Representing the
Knowledge of Experts, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT
PERFORMANCE 203 (K. Anders Ericsson, et al. eds., 2006).
15 Klein, supra note 12.
16 Id.
17 MICHELENE, T.H. CHI, Laboratory Methods for Assessing Experts' and Novices'
Knowledge, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK FOR EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE
167 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006).
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thinking as they do so. The approach has been used to study the cognitive
processes that distinguish experts in fields like physics and medicine from
novices and journeymen. 18 Mediators cannot think aloud in the midst of a
session but they can be asked to view their recorded video performance and
report on what they were thinking as the session unfolded. This "stimulated
recall" procedure has been used to study the cognition of sports coaches,
teachers, and psychotherapists.19
My desire to adopt these methods to the study of mediation resulted in
two interconnected investigations involving seventeen experienced mediators
and five novices who were invited into the lab and asked to mediate The
Angry Roommates, a simulated conflict between two college women. 20 Two
carefully prepared undergraduate actors played the roles of the college
roommates. The conflict was constructed to involve both surface issues (e.g.
messiness, noise in the room) and deeper relational ones, since my research
at the family court and NIH had suggested that latent issues could be a
significant concern for some mediators.
To help us understand the nature of mediator decisionmaking, each of the
mediators was asked to conduct an initial thirty-minute interview with the
parties and then watch a video of their performance immediately after the
session. After the stimulated recall session, the participants were interviewed
at length about what had occurred in the session, their understanding of the
conflict, and the degree to which their performance was representative of
their general approach to practice. Subsequently, three trained observers also
viewed the video of the mediation session with instructions to rate the
behavior of the mediator, describe the hallmarks of the mediator's
performance, and make inferences about the kinds of tacit mediator thinking
that could plausibly account for how the mediator had behaved. We learned
two major things about how mediators make decisions from these
procedures.
18 K. ANDERS ERICssON, Protocol Analysis and Expert Thought: Concurrent
Verbalizations of Thinking During Experts' Performance on Representative Tasks, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE (K. Anders
Ericsson et al. eds., 2006).
19 John Lyle, Stimulated Recall: A Report on its Use in Naturalistic Research, 29
BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 861, 861-78 (2003). See generally Keith D. Morran, et al., Empirical
Investigations of Counselor Self-Talk Categories, 36 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 505
(1989).
20 Kressel et al., supra note 3.
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IV. THE ROLE OF FORMAL MODELS OF PRACTICE IN MEDIATOR
DECISIONMAKING.
The first thing we learned is that mediators were undoubtedly relying on
formal models of practice to help them decide what to do. Formal models of
practice exist in all professional domains. In the field of psychotherapy, for
example, there are numerous formal models, all competing for the allegiance
of the practitioner. Two that are familiar to the educated public are cognitive
behavioral therapy and psychodynamic therapy. There are many more. In
mediation we also have our formal models. They go by familiar names like
facilitative, evaluative, or transformative mediation.
In whatever discipline they occur, formal models specify an
understanding of basic phenomena relevant to the domain (e.g. the nature of
psychopathology, the nature of polarized conflict), the goals to be sought by
professional assistance, and the kinds of interventions to be used (or avoided)
in the pursuit of those goals. Formal models of practice have some other
characteristics. They are likely to be consciously held-experienced
professionals are able to describe their model of practice clearly if asked-
and widely shared among adherents. They are also helpful to practitioners:
focusing their attention, guiding their behavior, and providing confidence in
a demanding task.
As Figure 1 suggests, based on the judgments of our trained observers
and the roleplaying disputants, collectively speaking, some familiar models
of practice were alive and well in the minds of the twenty-two mediators who
dealt with our angry roommates.
The methodological and statistical details behind Figure I may be found
in the original report.21 Essentially, we used a procedure called multi-
dimensional scaling to aggregate the many ratings the observers and the
disputants made about each mediator to allow us to see the underlying
patterns of similarity/dissimilarity in how the mediators approached the
angry roommate conflict. We also used a consensual qualitative procedure
that has been used in the study of psychotherapy 22 to develop narrative
accounts of the manner in which mediators went about their task and the tacit
thinking that plausibly lay behind their behavior. Here I will simply
summarize the meaning of the results displayed in the figure in terms of what
they suggest about the role of formal models of practice in mediator
decisionmaking and behavior. Each point in the figure represents a single
mediator.
21 Id. at 135-50.
22 Clara E. Hill et al., A Guide to Conducting Consensual Qualitattive Research, 25
COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 517 (1997).
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Figure 123
Less Skillful
Evaluators
0
Transformatives
o 0 0
0
Relationally Settlement
oriented oriented
o 0
00
Diagnosticians
Facilitators
More skillful
Note: Each point represents a single mediator.
Two things immediately stand out. First, our mediators divided along a
familar settlement vs. relational orientation. Formal models of mediation
practice tend to emphasize one 'or the other of these orientations. 24 The
second, illustrated by the labels we have provided, is that the numerous
judgements the observers and disputants made of each mediator coalesced
around the hallmarks of well-known models of practice within these two
orientations.
Thus, at the settlement-oriented end of the horizontal axis were two
stylistic subgroups with very close affinities to the familiar Faciliative and
Evaluative models of practice which Riskin's 25 seminal paper first described.
For the eleven facilitators, the primary goal was getting an agreement that
would end hostilities, and the primary vehicle for doing so was creating a
positive climate and structuring a negotiating agenda. Their signal
characteristic was warmth, optimism, and energy in promoting the search for
agreements. They showed little interest in latent causes of the girls'
difficulties with each other or exploring emotional aspects of the conflict. By
23 Kressel et al., supra note 3 at 150.
24 KENNETH KRESSEL, Mediation Revisited, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 726 (Morton Deutsch et. al. eds., 2006).
25 See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 7 (1996).
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and large they also refrained from expressing their own opinion on
substantive issues.
Like the facilitators, the primary goal of the four evaluators in Figure
I was agreement making. They showed a similar lack of interest in
exploring latent causes of conflict or addressing emotional concerns. The
distinguishing element in their behavior was an inclination to challenge
the parties when the mediator felt either of them was being unreasonable
and to express, sometimes rather bluntly, what they felt was a more
reasonable response to the other's concerns.
At the relational end of Figure 1, two other formal models of practice
are represented. The more familiar of the two is represented by the
practitioners in the top left segment of the figure. All four were explicitly
identified with Bush & Folger's Transformative 26 approach and enacted it
in a highly similar style. Their explicit objective, described in nearly
identical language at the outset of the session, was to help create a
"dialogue" between the roommates so that each might better explore both
their own and the other's pespectives. Their most characteristic
intervention was frequent summarizing of the parties' statements and a
determined effort not to express an opinion or influence the agenda in any
way.
At the bottom left side of the figure are two mediators we have
labelled the Diagnosticians. They shared some of the same willingness to
help with agreement-making that characterized the Facilitators and
Evaluators, but the dominant theme in their performance was a concern
with exploring the latent interpersonal, emotional, and psychological
sources of the conflict-very much in the manner of the approach my
divorce mediation colleagues and I stumbled upon (with the help of Fran
Butler), and that Howard Gadlin and his NIH ombuds colleagues turned
out to be using (despite their original disclaimers of allegiance to any
formal model). This model of practice occurs in other settings as well,27
although it is less well codified and distributed in the world of practice
than the other three models.28
26 See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(1994).
27 See generally Kenneth Kressel, The Strategic Style in Mediation, 24 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 251 (2007).
28 The vertical axis of the figure indicates that the observer and disputant ratings
also reflect judgments about mediator skill, with the Facilitators and Diagnosticians being
judged as more thorough in gathering information, as having developed a better
understanding of how to help and of creating better rapport, a more comfortable climate
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Obviously, our numbers are too small to make any claims about how
representative these findings are to the actual world of practice. The
results do serve to illustrate the main point: Mediators are clearly
influenced by formal models of practice and different mediators adopt
very different models, even in a very simple dispute.
V. BEYOND FORMAL MODELS: THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT SCHEMAS OF
PRACTICE IN MEDIATOR DECISIONMAKING
The second major lesson from the Angry Roomates study is that
formal models of practice are not the whole answer to the decisionmaking
challenges which mediators face. This is still a work in progress, but we
have learned enough to make a preliminary report worthwhile. Before
proceeding, however, it is worth summarizing why we reasoned that the
formal models of practice we identified in the first part of our analysis
could only represent an incomplete guide to the task of deciding what to
do in the hurly-burly of a mediation session. I can think of at least 4 such
reasons:
* Mediation is a relatively new and highly interdisciplinary area of
professional practice where well-established formal models are still relatively
weakly defined and taught-e.g. 40-hour training programs are sufficient to
qualify for many mediation panels; textbooks and other scholarly treatises on
how to perform within a given model are relatively few (cf. a more well-
established field like psychotherapy).
* Formal models are generic and therefore insufficiently precise-no
formal model can account for the uniqueness of different conflicts/disputants
and the highly unpredictable and rapid interactions unfolding in front of the
mediator.
* Formal models are inevitably sifted through each mediator's unique
beliefs, values, and experiences. It is these idiosyncratic characteristics that
are likely to shape what mediators actually deliver and what clients
expenence.
* Much of mediator decisionmaking inevitably occurs at an implicit,
non-conscious level, whereas formal models exist largely at the explicit,
conscious level. This is the lesson of work by Gary Klein and others who
study real world decisionmaking and also of the work of cognitive
psychologists who have reliably demonstrated that human cognition is a dual
and a fairer, more unbiased atmosphere. These results are less central to the issue of the
role of formal models on mediator decisionmaking, so I have de-emphasized them for the
purposes of this discussion.
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process system, in which a good deal of cognitive activity, especially in
regard to decisionmaking, occurs outside of conscious awareness. 29
If formal models of practice do not provide a complete understanding of
mediator decisionmaking, what else is there? We formulated our answer to
this question around the concept of mediator schemas ofpractice.30
We may define a schema of mediation practice as the partly explicit, but
largely tacit and highly idiosyncratic ideas the mediator holds about the role
of the mediator; the goals to be attained (and avoided), and the interventions
that are permissible (and are impermissible) in striving to reach those goals.
As I have previously noted, these are the same concerns that formal models
of mediation practice are concerned with. Although the concerns are the
same there are important differences. The most salient contrasts are set forth
in Table 1. The most important is the last one. Whereas formal models
represent the known "textbooks" of practice, schemas of practice may be
thought of as the largely uncharted "cognitive underbelly" of practice. One
way to improve practice therefore, is to chart this unknown cognitive
territory, particularly as it exists in the minds of our best practitioners.
Essentially, this has been the task of our second examination of the data from
The Angry Roommates.
Table 1
Formal Models of Practice Schemas of Practice
Based on a formal theory of conflict Based primarily on informal,
and the role of the mediator "intuitive," and personal "mini-
theories" of conflict & the role of the
mediator
Explicit and self-conscious Partly explicit, but with a large
implicit component
Widely disseminated in the Largely 'hidden" within the practice
community of practitioners (the community (the "cognitive
"textbooks" of practice) underbelly" of practice).
2 9 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
30 We could as well have used the term "mental model" of practice as Howard
Gadlin and I did in the NIH study. I have not had time to debate the pros and cons of
terminology, so I will stick with the "cognitive schema" usage that we spontaneously
adopted (perhaps because in my home discipline of social psychology it is more familiar
and well-worn).
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This examination was based on additional assumptions about schematic
knowledge derived from the studies at the family court and NIH, and from
my reading of the literatures on expert judgment, decisionmaking, and social
cognition. The main assumptions were these:
* Schemas of practice may be viewed as mediator coping
responses to the complex and demanding task of intervention
decisionmaking and the limitations of formal models of practice
and conscious human deliberation. In the language of the
cognitive psychologist, Gerd Gigerenzer, their component
elements may be thought of as tacit adaptive rules of thumb31
suited to the particular environments in which the mediator
typically works.
* Every schema of practice contains inherent tensions; none is
likely to be a perfect "solution" to intervention decisionmaking.
This is because the task of mediating is inherently complex,
permits multiple solutions, and is ambiguous as to what qualifies
as a "successful" result. (In the words of cognitive psychology,
mediation is a domain that deals with "ill-defined problems.")
* There will be a poor to moderate fit between the explicit
elements of the mediator's schema-what the mediator is
consciously aware of and can easily talk about-and its implicit
elements. This gap is the consequence of the notion that human
cognition depends on a slower, more self-aware, labor intensive
System 2, and a more rapid, more efficient, but largely
unconscious System 1.32 The decisionmaking climate that
generally prevails in mediation-the need for repetitive, rapid
decisions about complex matters-distinctly favors a reliance on
System 1 thinking. A corollary of this fact is that the mediator's
schema of practice, which is weighted more to tacit,
nonconscious knowledge, is likely to exert a greater influence on
the decisionmaking process than the mediator's reliance on a
formal model (or models) of practice.
My colleagues and I developed a case protocol to explore these
assumptions and used it in a consensual procedure similar to the one we had
31 GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 47
(2008).
32 Kahneman, supra note 30.
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used in the first stage of our effort. The protocol contained questions on
several major topics: What are the key components of the mediator's schema
of practice? What "tensions" are detectable in the mediator's schema? How
does the mediator appear to cope with the inherent limitations that his or her
schema poses? In particular, how flexible is his or her behavior as the
disputants react to his or her decisionmaking moves and how reflective does
the mediator appear to be as he or she reviews his or her performance
during the stimulated recall session and the post-mediation interview?
We have thus far analyzed seven of our eight exemplar mediators.
Obviously, ours is a very small sample, even when fully analyzed, and the
study itself is highly exploratory in nature. Nonetheless, we have learned
some interesting things about the characteristics and consequences of
schemas of mediation practice. Here is a list of the most striking ones so far:
A. Different Schemas of Practice May Involve Very Different Ideas
About Basic Phenomena and How They Relate to the Mediator's
Task
For example, the notion of "conflict" took on a variety of contrasting
meanings (sometimes explicit, sometimes inferable from mediator behavior).
Thus, in the schema of some of our exemplars, "conflict" was a phenomenon
of considerable curiosity and interest, and as offering creative opportunities
for problem-solving. In the schema of other exemplars, "conflict" was more
the sign of a "problem"-inevitable and necessary, perhaps-but one
primarily in need of being "contained." Perhaps because of this fundamental
division, other important phenomena were also defined very differently.
Thus, for some of our exemplars, emotionality had the positive status of
conveying important and useful information, whereas in the schema of
others, emotion had the status of an impediment to rationale problem-solving
that needed to be carefully managed and dampened. Notions of rapport and
empathy showed similar difference. Thus, two of our exemplars were
extremely good at expressions of empathy and establishing rapport with the
disputants, but the motive seemed primarily to use these capacities as a
surface "lubricant" to smooth the path to agreement-making (as in the adroit
use of humor); for two other exemplars with similar skills, empathy and
rapport seemed more the expression of a deeper curiosity and reflective
interest in the dispute.
B. The Explicit Elements of a Mediator's Schema of Practice May be
Contradicted by the Implicit Elements.
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Many of the mediators with a settlement-oriented schema of practice
talked explicitly of having a "win-win" as a primary goal. As we all know, in
formal models of practice, especially the facilitative one, win-win language
refers to the process of getting beneath positional bargaining by surfacing
each side's underlying needs and interests in an effort to find such
solutions. 33 However, observers saw almost no such efforts on the part of
mediators with an ostensible facilitative orientation. Instead, what they saw
with considerable frequency was a search for compromise around the surface
positions that each roommate had staked out, with little or no probing for the
interests or needs underlying those positions.
Mediator RJ provides another illustration of the gap between the explicit
and tacit elements in a mediator's orientation. In Figure 1, he was classified
as one of the evaluative mediators. In the pre-mediation questionnaire, RJ
described himself as highly eclectic. His goals included both settlement ("a
mutually acceptable agreement") and relational ones ("an improved future
relationship"), and the behaviors associated with each ("fact-finding,
analysis, and counseling"). He explicitly rejected "brow-beating, intolerance,
and decisionmaking." Overall, stylistic eclecticism of this kind is what the
majority of mediators report when asked to describe their approach.34
However, his in-session behavior revealed that his tacit schema of practice
allows wide scope for evaluative behaviors and few of the kind one would
expect in a relational, "counseling" orientation.
C. Schemas ofpractice can be "simple" or "complex."
Perhaps the most encompassing contrast between schemas of practice in
our exemplar sample is captured by the distinction between simple and
complex schemas. Of the seven mediators on whom we have completed
analysis, four had schemas of practice of the simple variety and three of the
more complex type. The differences between the two kinds of schema are set
forth in Table 2.35
33 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 231 (2d ed. 1996).
34 See generally Lorig Charkoudian, Cristian de Ritis, Ramona Buck & Carrie L.
Wilson, Mediation by any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet-or Would it?, 26
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 293 (2009); Cheryl A. Picard, Exploring an Integrative Framework
for Understanding Mediation, 21 CONFLICT RES. Q. 295 (2004).
35 The remaining mediator had a schema that seemed to fit somewhere between
simple and complex.
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Table 2
Implicit Mediator Decisionmaking Schema
[Vol.28:3 20131
Simple Schiemas Complex Schemas
More reliant on a formal model of Less reliant on a formal model of
practice (either relational or practice
settlement)
Involve simpler intervention Involve a diversity of intervention
strategies and more straightforward strategies and nuanced procedural
"linear" procedural scripts "scripts"
Involve lower levels of decisional Involve more decisional stress for
stress for the mediator the mediator (e.g. when, whether,
and how to move from relational to
settlement objectives)
May be associated with less May be associated with more
motivation for reflective learning motivation for reflective learning
May be executed well or less well May be executed well or less well
Simple schemas appear to depend very heavily on a formal model of
practice, whether consciously or not. Thus, two of our exemplars were
articulate and explicit adherents of the Facilitative settlement style, and one
of the Transformative model. In their pre and post-settlement statements, in-
session behavior, stimulated recall session, and post-mediation interviews, all
three were well aligned with their respective formal approaches to practice.
In the case of RJ, as already noted, his explicit allegiance was with an
eclectic orientation with settlement and relational goals, but his performance
and thinking made it apparent that his mediational heart (at least in this
conflict) was strongly aligned with an evaluative approach to practice.
Mediators with simple schemas also appeared to favor clear, linear
behavioral scripts, largely as a reflection of their reliance on their formal
models. For the two Facilitatively inclined exemplars, the behavioral script
involved a "straight as an arrow" progression of agenda setting,
encouragement of an exchange of proposals, assistance with idea generation
(via brainstorming) when the parties' negotiating efforts foundered, and a
closing summary of the terms agreed to-the entire performance leavened
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with encouragement and praise. For the Transformative exemplar the
behavioral script was even simpler: a determined focus on reflecting back to
the parties what they had been saying with an occasional question about what
the parties wanted to talk about when exchanges halted.
Reflecting their straightforward and well-practiced scripts, mediators
with a simple schema showed little evidence of decisional stress as they
reported on their thinking in the stimulated recall session or talked about
their performance in the post-mediation interview. For the most part they
were satisfied with what they had done and that they had proceeded in a
prescribed manner in which they believed. This loyalty appears to have left
little room for reflective curiosity as they watched themselves mediating or
talked about the case in and after the stimulated recall session. While there
was an occasional regret, confidence that a prescribed model had been
followed seemed to hold in check any serious self-scrutiny.
MP, for example, who was strongly identified with the Transformative
formal model, was open to self-doubt and a degree of reflection about his
performance. However, these efforts were narrowly confined to his
predominant strategy of summarizing the girls' statements. MP might argue
that if the process went on long enough and involved a real conflict,
recognition and empowerment would eventually occur by these means.
Perhaps. However, it was his failure to ask questions and give the disputants
more oppotunity to put information on the table that seemed to the observers
to impoverish the dialogue he was intent on creating. But his simple schema
of transformative practice ironically made it hard for him to benefit from the
stimulated recall session. MP was self-critical as he watched himself on the
video, but could not learn much because what he cared about (e.g. that he
was not more "crisp" in some of his summaries) did not seem to the
observers to be what was at the heart of his poor performance.
Simple schema had an uneven relationship to observer judgments about
the quality of mediator performance. In the two instances in which the simple
script was based on a facilitative formal model of practice the mediators
received very high ratings from the roleplayers, but the observers were less
sanguine, largely because they were aware that several important latent
elements built into the conflict were never dealt with or even recognized by
the mediator. In the two cases where a simple schema rested on an evaluative
(RJ) or transformative model (MP), the disputants and the observers were far
less satisfied. One possible explanation may be that in these two cases the
simple schemas influencing the mediator's performance provided a very
narrow range of behavioral options that notably did not include responding
with praise or enthusiasm to the parties' negotiating efforts.
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In direct contrast with the characteristics of simple schemas displayed in
Table 2, complex schemas were far less reliant on a formal model of practice,
involved a more diverse and nuanced set of behavioral scripts, more
decisional uncertainty and stress for the mediator, and were associated with
more efforts at reflective learning in the stimulated recall session and the post
mediation interview. As with the simple schemas of practice, however,
complex schema could be executed well or less well.
GN, classified as following a Diagnostic formal model of practice in
Figure 1, illustrates many of these qualities. Her performance as well as her
explicit thoughts about the mediation and the session itself reflects a schema
with multiple allegiances to various formal models, with the exception of the
evaluative approach that she explicitly rejected. She was quite clear that the
context in which mediation occurs should influence what the mediator does
and how the mediator thinks about their role, a point of view that, amazingly
enough, no other mediator expressed. She commented:
"My approach typically relates to context. E.g. in REDRESS [the US
Postal service mediation program] I would assume a transformative
approach [mandated by that program]; In EEOC I would probably use a
combo of transformative and facilitative, with more of a thrust toward
settlement. In divorce mediation-transformative and a lot of problem-
solving."
Her identification with a multiplicity of approaches was associated with a
skillful blending of settlement and relational emphases. In the beginning of
the session GN tried to help the disputants address their broken friendship,
the relational focus encouraged by her strong allegiance to a Transformative
model of practice. The girls were not ready for this, however, responding
defensively and with mutual accusations. GN backed off, and followed the
girls' inclination to address the surface issues in their conflict. In this phase,
which occupied a long period in the middle of the session, GN performed
very much like the more skillful mediators with a settlement-only schema,
making suggestions, exploring practical details, and trying to help the parties
listen to each other for possible areas of compromise.
Toward the end of the session, after the negotiating mode had begun to
bog down in nit picking and defensivness, there was a dramatic shift into
relational issues, when GN asked: "Do you guys ever have a chance to hang
out anymore?" The rest of the session was devoted to exploring what caused
them to lose touch and efforts to help them explore how they felt about the
loss of contact and what might be done to recapture their friendship. This
shift back into GN's preferred relational mode gave something of a
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triumphant and meaningful focus to the session in which the girls seemed
very much engaged.
The implicit decision rule behind GN's entire performance seemed to be:
"First meet the parties where they are; once rapport has been established and
their initial desires addressed, see if you can help them explore the deeper,
more difficult to talk about relational and emotional issues in their dispute."
A schema with multiple goals and decisional choice points would seem,
inevitably, to place more decisional stress on the mediator. Quite simply,
there is more to decide about than there is in the case of simple schemas of
intervention. MK, a mediator with a complex schema, much like GN's, spoke
several times about such stress. For example, in the stimulated recall session
she stopped the video to comment on her struggle to either stay with the
surface issues the disputant was talking about or attempt to explore more
latent psychological material:
I'm thinking here-when she said, "She's acting worse than my
mom"-in my psychology head I was thinking about all the
psychodynamics involved with parenting and family relationships; and I
thought that this must feel like to her like a very infantalizing experience
right at the time when she's wanting to be autonomous and be grown up.
But that was too complicated of an issue to bring up, because I didn't quite
know how to do it.. So, I opted to let the moment pass and see what she
would do and follow that and maybe come back to that later (italics added).
Complex mediation schemas may also be characterized by a relaxed
capacity for reflective learning, both during and after the mediation
experience. MK's remark, above, is a good illustration. (Schon has referred
to such thinking as "reflection in action.") Several more examples could be
cited both from MK's and GN's stimulated recall sessions and post-
mediation interviews.
One could argue that to enact complex schemas well, such openness to
reflective learning may be mandatory. SM, who also had a complex schema
containing both relational and settlement goals and diverse intervention
scripts, had much less patience with herself, tending to be both sharply self-
critical as she watched her performance and simultaneously self-accepting
("that's how I do things; they have to take me as I am"). Although the
roleplayers gave her generally high marks for her energy and evident
commitment to trying to help, the observers felt that she executed her
complex schema far less adroitly than GN and MK, and learned less from the
experience.
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D. A Practitioner's Schema ofPractice May Block Access to Other
Useful Knowledge the Mediator Possesses.
The relationship between schemas of practice and a mediator's capacity
for reflective learning is one illustration that schemas of practice can have
important consequences. Another consequence is that a practitioner's schema
may block the mediator's access to useful knowledge that they possess.
For example, HJ, in addition to being a mediator, is also an experienced
master's level psychological counselor who works with families. However,
in the post mediation interview he commented: "A lot of times, once you're
working with families, you start peeling away a little bit and there's usually
something underneath. Mediation's a little bit different. People are more on
the table about what's bothering them and they don't see it as a lot of
underlying problems." (italics added). What is fascinating here is how JH's
mediation schema leads to an unexamined assumption about the disputants.
They, in fact, were very much primed to talk about important latent issues
fueling their conflict (e.g. a cafeteria incident in which one roommate
pointedly ignored the other) but were instructed only to do so if probed in a
relevant way (as GN did when she asked, "do you guys hang out anymore?").
Another illustration: MP's mediation performance, his stimulated recall
protocol, and most of the post-mediation interview suggest that he may lack
psychological insight altogether. Only when the interviewer presses him does
he reveal a deeper understanding of the conflict.
Interviewer: What do you think is causing the conflict?
MP: [This is] not an analysis I would do as a mediator at the time of
mediation. I'm perfectly happy to do it right now. See, I'm your mediator.
I'm not your conflict consultant. [italics added]. There's kind of a
difference. . . Christine needs a more regulated environment in terms of
neatness and from Monica's point of view that's creating an atmosphere of
restrictiveness that's difficult. Then there's sort of a psychological level . . .
Christine was saying that Monica was just this irresponsible slob who is sort
of valueless. And, in fact, what she, Christine, isn't saying is that Monica
went to her and tried to open this up; to talk about it.
Interviewer: Are you speaking of the cafeteria incident?
MP: Yeah. What I went with is that she felt closed down . .. it's not my
intent to smoke this kind of stuff out. In a real mediation, if it really
mattered it would have cycled back. [Italics added].
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MP's rationale is consistent with his strict adherence to a formal
Transformative model and his translation of that model into his own "simple"
schema of practice. It is arguably possible that if the conflict was real and
more time was available that the emotional currents would have "cycled
back." In point of fact, however, GN, who shared MP's Transformative
background, did engage the latent psychological issues to good effect in our
brief simulated dispute.
E. The Effectiveness of a Practitioner's Schema is Partly a Function of
"Fit."
The effectiveness of different approaches to mediation practice is a
subject on which there is notoriously little sound empirical data. Jim Wall
and I have just edited a forthcoming issue of Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research devoted to research on mediator style that makes this
abundantly clear.36 Our Angry Roommates study, of course, has no direct
bearing on this matter, given our very small sample. However, there are
interesting suggestions that the success of an approach to practice is likely to
be affected by a number of factors besides how skillfully the mediator enacts
their schema.
One of these candidates may be the parties' expectations or needs. Our
college student roleplayers reserved their most favorable ratings to the two
exemplars who possessed what I have referred to as simple facilitative
schema devoted largely to a well-structured negotiation around a search for
compromise solutions to their positional stances, leavened with lots of
encouragement and non-judgmental energy. This approach seemed to match
the girls' expectations of mediation and perhaps fit better with the
developmental needs of young adults embroiled in a conflict that had the
quality of a family squabble among siblings. They were much less happy
with mediators who seemed to want them to take the lead (those exempars
with a narrow transformatively based schema) or who were more
judgementally parental.
Another determinant of how well a mediator's schema works in a
particular dispute may be the degree to which the conflict fits with the
mediator's interests and needs. MT, for example, was a seasoned lawyer with
an extensive and successful backgroud mediating complex business and
personal disputes who very much enjoyed the analytic challenges which such
conflicts often pose. A dispute between two college roommates revolving
36 James A. Wall & Kenneth Kressel, Research on Mediator Style: A Summary and
Some Research Suggestions, NEGOT. CONFLICT MGMT. RES. (forthcoming).
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around hurt feelings may have been too inconsequental to engage him, as his
dry, disengaged tone and abrupt ending of the session suggested. The virtues
of his schema might have been more apparent in a conflict more to his liking.
Mediator "personality," however vague a term that may be, may also aid or
hinder the impact of the mediator's schema of practice. Ordinarily, we would
expect mediators to be inclined, consciously or otherwise, towards schemas
that suit their temperaments and proclivities. This appears to have been the
case with JA and HJ. JA, by her own admission, is a person who relishes
structure. She has a sunny disposition, likes people, and is not inclined to
search for ambiguity in human relationships. These qualities translated into
an enthusiastic embrace of a schema of practice emphasizing a well-
structured, supportive orchestration of negotiations around surface issues.
HJ's good-humored, "hail fellow well met" persona was likewise a good fit
with his similar schema of practice.
In the case of SM, however, schema and persona fit much less well. She
had a complex schema that emphasized both settlement and relational goals
and an extremely open-minded embrace of any and all strategies that might
assist her in reaching those goals. Unfortunately, she was also highly self-
critical, impulsive at times, and impatient for results. These qualities left her
limp and dissatisfied by the time her experience in the lab was over.
V. WHAT NEXT?
The studies my colleagues and I have done indicate that neither
unexamined intuition nor the reliance on formal models of practice provide
anything like a complete account of how mediators decide what to do under
the demanding and uncertain conditions under which they work. We have
learned that tacit knowledge, which we have variously described under
headings like mediator "styles," "mental models," or "schemas of practice,"
play a powerful role in such decisionmaking; are often at striking variance
with what practitioners consciously believe they are doing; and can be gotten
at by methods that help practitioners access their tacit decisionmaking
knowledge. All of these ideas are totally consistent with what researchers
who study real-world decisionmaking and professional expertise in other
domains have been learning. They are also likely to have immediate pay-offs
in improving practice for the experienced mediator and for the development
of training programs tailored to the very different contexts in which
mediators are expected to perform.
This being the case, I am convinced that we must promote efforts to
engage mediation practitioners in reflective, case-based research. The
dominant research models in the study of mediation assign priority to
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precision, control, and the aggregation of data. As far as I can tell, however,
they have had very little impact on practice, other than to reassure nervous
provider organizations that mediation "works." Reflective research, on the
other hand fits naturally with the practical concerns of mediators and the
pragmatic, case-oriented way of thinking that mediators are already inclined
towards when they talk shop with each other. The trouble with shoptalk,
however, is that it is relatively infrequent, unsystematic, and evanescent. To
engage practitioners in something more useful a number of things are
needed.
First, we need to develop clear, well-structured methods of reflective
research. Fields that have developed clear and widely accepted templates for
research tend to advance more rapidly. The basic components of a template
for reflective research about mediator decisionmaking include systematic
protocols for case reflection, norms of reflection designed to counter
evaluation apprehension and group think, and the use of a reflective
facilitator/observer. 37 The research my colleagues and I have done has
established these basic parameters. However, there is more to be done on the
methodological front. One step is to move towards reflective methods based
on in vivo observation of mediators at work, rather than relying exclusively
on the retrospective recall of the mediator. Our lab study was based on this
idea, but in vivo studies of real conflicts would be preferable to the simulated
method we used. Kathleen Moore, one of the ombuds-mediators in the
original NIH study, has been experimenting with an in vivo model in the
training of interns and new staff members at the NIH and the early returns
are encouraging.
Studying novices or journeymen can tell us something about how
expertise develops, but I also believe that we need to focus primarily on the
decisionmaking of expert practitioners and of high profile groups of expert
practitioners, like those at NIH, in our federal court systems, or in influential
mediation provider organizations. We will get a bigger bang for our buck if
we did so. However, identifying truly expert mediators is a challenging task.
Since we lack the kind of objective measures of expertise in mediation that
we have in say chess or sports, we are bound to rely on some type of
consensual agreement about who the competent mediators are whose practice
we should be studying. One way to start is to focus on the selection of expert
mediators within a well-specified domain of practice who have a consistent
reputation among their colleagues and clients for being helpful and skilled.
The next step might be to screen this group further. Not every expert is a
37 See generally Kenneth Kressel, Practice-Relevant Research in Mediation:
Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm, 13 NEGOT. J. 143 (1997).
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good candidate for reflective research. To participate constructively in the
reflective enterprise requires tolerance for ambiguity, cognitive flexibility,
and ego-strength. It would be useful to bear such qualities in mind when
soliciting mediators to participate in our studies.
Another methodological need is to develop methods that are feasible.
Mediators are busy people and the methods my colleagues and I have used
are highly labor and time intensive. We need to develop methods that can be
used by individual practitioners or small groups of practitioners that keep
such costs to a minimum, but are systematic enough to be informative and
rewarding.
In planning reflective research I also think we need to be mindful of the
very different contexts in which mediation is practiced. The practitioner
literature on mediation is notorious for paying scant attention to these
contextual matters.38 Mediating in the shadow of science presents very
different cognitive challenges, opportunities, and pressures than mediating in
other very different environments. That is why the mental model of the NIH
team, with its robust preference for a latent cause intervention script and the
decision rules that support it, looks so different from the mental models we
may infer from accounts of seasoned mediators working in labor
mediation; 39 international conflict;40 or on cases referred to mediation by the
civil courts.41 Accordingly, comparative studies of mediator cognition in
very different settings are needed, since so much of the writing about formal
models of practice and so many of our training programs are based on an
unexamined notion that "one size fits all."
It is not yet clear on what dimensions the sites in such comparative
research should be selected, but the studies my colleagues and I have done
suggests a list that would include whether or not the mediators are
"embedded" in a particular institutional context with which they are highly
identified (as in the NIH case) and whose patterns of dysfunctional conflict
38 D.G. Pruitt, Mediation at the Millennium, in HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION:
BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 395-411 (M. S. Herman ed. 2006)
39 Jeanne M. Brett, Rita Drieghe & Debra L. Shapiro, Mediator Style and Mediation
Effectiveness, 2 NEGOT. J. 277, 277-85 (1986). See generally DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE
MEDIATORS (1983).
40 Jacob Bercovitch & Su-Mi Lee, Mediating International Conflicts: Examining the
Effectiveness of Directive Strategies, 8 INT'L J. PEACE STUD. 1, 1-17 (2003). See
generally Saadia Touval & William I. Zartman, Mediation in International Conflicts, in
MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY
INTERVENTION (Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt eds., 1989).
41 See generally James A. Wall & Suzanne Chan-Serafin, Processes in Civil
Mediations, 26 CONFLICT RES. Q. 261 (2009).
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they come to know well; have opportunities for case consultation with
colleagues; deal with disputes involving parties with ongoing relationships
who are negotiating about more than just money; and are not under intense
time pressure (real or imagined) to settle in an hour or two. In settings in
which all or most of these elements are present, we would predict that
mediator decisionmaking-at least among the most competent
practitioners-would rest on very different tacit schemas of practice than in
those settings in which these factors are absent. I am very much in favor of
collaborative multi-site programs to pursue this key hypothesis.
Finally, I believe that it would be enormously helpful in the pursuit of the
agenda I have outlined if it had the imprimatur and practical support of high
profile organizations within the ADR community. The domain of
professional practice mediation can no longer be considered as being in its
infancy. It is now entering its fourth decade as a widely practiced and often
well-remunerated activity. Yet there are troubling signs that the field is not
advancing in its knowledge about what constitutes competent practice at
anything like the rate one might wish. For example, while the formulation of
formal models of mediation practice has been proliferating since the 1990s-
25 new models by one recent count42-there has been little sustained
attention to how mediators actually implement these models or think about
them, especially at the tacit level that our work has shown to be so difficult to
predict from what mediators are consciously aware of. Research of this kind
is likely to be time-consuming, costly, and even difficult for many individual
provider organizations to understand.43 To have an impact the findings will
also need to be disseminated and taken seriously by the practice community.
For these purposes there is no substitute for strong institutional
leadership. The Dispute Resolution Section of the Bar Association, the
Association of Conflict Resolution, and state and local mediation
organizations have made efforts along these lines, but I believe that much
more sustained and collaborative efforts are needed if we are to have the
kinds of research that matters to practice.
42 James A. Wall & Timothy C. Dunne, Mediation Research: A Current Review, 28
NEGOT. J. 217, 217-244 (2012).
43 See generally E. P. McDermott, Discovering the Importance of Mediator Style-
An Interdisciplinary Challenge, NEGOT. CONFLICT MGMT. RES. (forthcoming); Lisa B.
Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the U.S. Postal Service, 5 NEGOT. CONFLICT
MGMT. REs. (forthcoming 2012); Wall & Kressel, supra note 37.
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